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GENDER-BASED HARASSMENT AND THE
HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
Gender discrimination is a pervasive evil that potentially confronts
all women who enter the job market. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 provides female employees with remedies for gender discrimination
affecting the "terms, conditions, or privileges" of their employment.'
When an employer discriminates against women with regard to tradi-
tional "terms" of employment, such as hiring, firing, and promotion, ag-
grieved employees may seek a remedy under Title VII by filing disparate
treatment or disparate impact claims.2 Gender discrimination, however,
often affects an altogether different aspect of the employment relation-
ship-the work atmosphere. Courts have recognized that the environ-
ment in which an employee works is a protected "term" of employment
under Title VII.3 Female employees may thus bring what are known as
"hostile work environment actions" to remedy gender discrimination
that poisons the work atmosphere.4
1. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988). Subsection (a)
of the statute provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(l) to fail or refuse to hire
or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id. § 2000e-2(a)(l).
2. For the standards of proof for a disparate treatment claim, see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (allegation of racially discriminatory refusal to re-hire a black employee);
and Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (allegation of gender dis-
crimination in employer's decision not to promote and to subsequently terminate female employee).
For the standards of proof for a disparate impact claim, see Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424
(1971) (allegation that high school diploma requirement and use of standardized intelligence test as
criteria for hiring and promotion have racially discriminatory impact); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank
& Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988) (allegation that use of subjective criteria in promotion decisions has
racially discriminatory impact); Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (alle-
gation that employer's hiring and promotion policies create racial stratification in work force).
3. See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) ("Title VII affords employees the
right to work in an environment free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult."); Rog-
ers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971) ("the phrase 'terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment' in Section 703 [codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988)] is an expansive concept which
sweeps within its protective ambit the practice of creating a working environment heavily charged
with ethnic or racial discrimination."), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972). The extent to which the
work environment is a protected "term" of employment is discussed in Part II of this Note.
4. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66. See infra text accompanying note 9. The hostile work environ-
ment remedy is also available for discrimination based on race, religion, and national origin. See
infra note 22.
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"Gender discrimination" is a broad category that encompasses all
unequal treatment motivated by an individual's maleness or femaleness.
This broad category can be divided into two subsets: (1) actions that
stem from sexual motives; and (2) actions that are based on an individ-
ual's gender, but are unrelated to sexual desires.5 Although this distinc-
tion is central to the following discussion,6 it is ultimately irrelevant for
purposes of Title VII. Title VII proscribes discrimination "because of...
[an] individual's... sex' 7 and thus facially applies to all gender-moti-
vated discrimination. The statute provides protection both from the em-
ployer who demands sexual favors as a condition of employment and
from the employer who refuses to hire women because he believes they
are inferior to men."
The Supreme Court held in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson that "a
plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by proving that discrimina-
tion based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment." 9
Despite the broad language in Meritor, many lower federal courts have
applied a rough distinction between sexually motivated gender discrimi-
nation (subset one above) and non-sexually motivated gender discrimina-
tion (subset two above) in their treatment of hostile work environment
claims. Lower federal courts have clearly recognized that an employer
who creates a hostile work environment by sexually harassing his em-
5. It is possible to hypothesize a third subset, gender discrimination which flows from a mix-
ture of sexual and non-sexual motives, as well as other entirely different modes of dividing the cate-
gory of gender discrimination. The division presented here is simply a useful construct for analyzing
the current judicial treatment of gender discrimination in the work environment.
6. See infra note 12.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). Title VII uses the term "sex" in the sense of "gender." See
Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (proper question in determining whether
discrimination against female employee is based on "sex" is whether discrimination is motivated by
her "womanhood"). This Note uses the phrase "gender discrimination" as coextensive with the
phrases "discrimination because of sex" and "discrimination based on sex."
8. The former practice, known as quidpro quo sexual harassment, has long been recognized as
a violation of Title VII. See Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (reversing summary
judgment for employer who attempted to abolish female employee's position after she refused de-
mands for sexual favors); Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Guidelines on Discrimina-
tion Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 1(a) (1988) [hereinafter EEOC Guidelines] (requirement that
an employee submit to sexual favors as a condition of employment constitutes sexual harassment in
violation of Title VII). The latter practice, of course, also violates the statute. See Bell v. Crackin
Good Bakers, Inc., 777 F.2d 1497, 1500 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (reversing summary judgment for employer
who failed to promote female employee and engaged in scheme to force her resignation where super-
visor indicated that "if it was left up to him he would never have any women employees.. ."); Bell
v. Birmingham Linen Serv., 715 F.2d 1552 (11th Cir. 1983) (reversing summary judgment for em-
ployer who declined to promote a female employee where evidence shows decision may have been
the result of a supervisor's attempt to keep women from attaining that position), cert. denied, 467
U.S. 1204 (1984).
9. 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986) (emphasis added).
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ployees violates Title VII.1O These courts, however, have not recognized
with similar clarity that an employer who poisons the work atmosphere
by engaging in gender-based harassment unrelated to sexual desires also
violates the statute.
The allegations at issue in Meritor exemplify the type of sexually
motivated conduct that lower federal courts consider actionable under
Title VII. In Meritor, Mechelle Vinson, an assistant branch manager
with Meritor Savings Bank, alleged that Sidney Taylor, the manager of
the office where she worked, subjected her to a three-year pattern of sex-
ual harassment and sexual abuse. Taylor allegedly propositioned Vinson
soon after she began working at the bank and then made repeated de-
mands for sexual favors. Vinson testified that she acquiesced in these
demands for fear of losing her job and estimated that she had intercourse
with Taylor between forty and fifty times over a three-year period. In
addition, Vinson alleged that Taylor publicly fondled her, exposed him-
self to her, and even forcibly raped her.11
Sexual harassment of the type alleged in Meritor obviously consti-
tutes an extremely serious offense, but sexual harassment is only a part of
the larger spectrum of gender discrimination that affects the work envi-
ronment. Female employees also face a broad range of harassment that
is motivated by gender but not by sexual desires. Thus, unwarranted
criticism, rudeness, ridicule, insults, and epithets directed at women in
the workplace may not be sexually motivated, but may nonetheless flow
from a gender-based animus. For ease of reference, this Note calls har-
assment that is motivated by gender, but is unrelated to sexual desires,
"gender-based harassment."12
Although gender-based harassment is as capable of creating abusive
working conditions as sexual harassment, it occupies a tenuous position
in the courts. Dwyer v. Smith 13 illustrates the uncertain status of allega-
tions of gender-based harassment. In Dwyer, a female police officer al-
leged that her co-workers and supervisors engaged in and tolerated a
pattern of abusive conduct that created a hostile work environment. The
10. Indeed, the lower federal courts preceded the Supreme Court in recognizing such a cause of
action. See Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897
(11th Cir. 1982); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934. See infra notes 51-51.
11. Mertor, 477 U.S. at 60.
12. Although the use of this phrase is a necessary construct for analyzing the current judicial
treatment of gender discrimination in the workplace, this Note takes the position that Title VII
admits of no distinction between "sexual harassment" and "gender-based harassment." In addition,
note that the phrase "gender-based harassment" is not coextensive with the phrase "gender discrimi-
nation." Gender discrimination refers to a broader range of conduct which includes actions moti-
vated by sexual desires.
13. 867 F.2d 184 (4th Cir. 1989).
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officer, Stephanie Dwyer, contended that her fellow officers referred to
women in degrading terms and that her supervisor subjected her to hu-
miliating treatment. She also alleged that fellow officers placed porno-
graphic material in her stationhouse mailbox and questioned her about
what she had received, accused her of having sexual relationships with
other officers, engaged in gratuitous conversations about sex crimes and
sexual behavior, and drove by her home to ascertain whether she had
male visitors. 14 Although these latter acts obviously contained sexual
overtones, they do not appear to have been motivated by sexual desires.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusion that
Dwyer had not made out "a prima facie claim of sexual harassment. "15
Her failure to allege that she was the victim of sexually motivated con-
duct was fatal to her case. The Fourth Circuit noted that during an in-
ternal affairs investigation, Dwyer "did not contend . . . that [her
supervisor] engaged in any suggestive behavior--only that he treated her
like a 'problem child.' "16 The court of appeals also viewed as significant
the district court's finding that "no sexual language was ever directed at
Dwyer."' 17 It is not clear whether either the district court or the Fourth
Circuit viewed Dwyer's allegations of gender-based harassment as ac-
tionable under Title VII. For instance, the district court stated that
"perhaps on occasion there has been inappropriate language and inap-
propriate references made to sex, but not harassment."' 8
The thesis of this Note is the relatively simple proposition that all
forms of gender discrimination that affect an employee's work environ-
ment are potentially actionable under Title VII without regard to
whether they arise from sexual motives. For purposes of Title VII, it is
entirely irrelevant that Stephanie Dwyer failed to state a claim of "sexual
harassment" or that she did not allege either "suggestive behavior" or
"sexual language." Dwyer contended that her employer engaged in a
pattern of harassment against her because she was a woman and that this
pattern of harassment created a hostile work environment. She thus al-
leged that discrimination "because of... sex" affected a "term" of her
14. Id. at 188.
15. Id. (emphasis added).
16. Id. (emphasis added).
17. Id. (emphasis added). The district court's statement indicates a flaw in its analysis of
Dwyer's claim. Existing precedent has established that an employer's "failure to direct intentionally
any discriminatory treatment toward [an employee] is simply not material to the finding of an un-
lawful employment practice." Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 239 (5th Cir. 1971) (optometrists'
practice of segregating patients on the basis of national origin creates hostile work environment for
Hispanic employee).
18. Dwyer, 867 F.2d at 188. The Fourth Circuit held that this finding was not clearly errone-
ous. Ia at 189.
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employment. These allegations are the only two requisites of a Title VII
violation; the statute imposes no additional requirement that a plaintiff
allege sexually motivated discrimination.
If the "inappropriate language" and "inappropriate references made
to sex" in Dwyer were directed at the plaintiff because of her gender, then
they were potentially actionable under Title VII. Dwyer was not neces-
sarily entitled to a remedy under the statute, but she was entitled to have
a court evaluate whether the conduct she complained of created a hostile
work environment. It is far from clear whether the district court or the
Fourth Circuit considered Dwyer's allegations of gender-based harass-
ment. Both opinions focused primarily on the existence of sexual harass-
ment, making it impossible to discern definitively whether or how
seriously either court weighed Dwyer's allegations of gender-based
harassment.
Dwyer thus illustrates a significant problem present in current hos-
tile work environment jurisprudence: A judicial focus on sexual harass-
ment has obscured the availability and reduced the effectiveness of Title
VII as a remedy for gender-based harassment. Many courts view egre-
gious sexual harassment of the type at issue in Meritor and other leading
hostile work environment cases as the paradigm of a Title VII violation.
Conduct that falls short of that mark is not viewed as a significant intru-
sion on an employee's working conditions. To be sure, courts have not
explicitly drawn a distinction between sexual harassment and gender-
based harassment, but hostile work environment actions are rarely suc-
cessful if an employee does not allege either sexually motivated behav-
ior-typically propositions, advances, or physical touchings--or conduct
of a "sexual nature."19
A second problem exists in the current judicial treatment of gender
discrimination in the work environment: Even those courts which recog-
nize that gender discrimination is actionable without regard to the pres-
ence of a sexual motive have indicated that employees possess a cause of
19. The phrase "conduct of a sexual nature" is derived from the EEOC Guidelines, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.1 1(a) (1988). As noted supra text accompanying note 9, the distinction courts draw between
sexually motivated gender discrimination and non-sexually motivated gender discrimination is a
rough one. For many courts, conduct which merely has a sexual content is actionable under Title
VII. Thus, while in Dwyer allegations of harassment merely possessing sexual overtones were insuf-
ficient to state a violation of the statute, other courts have found the existence of a hostile work
environment where an employer uses epithets with sexual connotations or permits pictorial displays
of nude women in the workplace. Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983) (hostile work environ-
ment exists where female air traffic controller's workplace pervaded by sexual slur, insult, and innu-
endo and degrading and vulgar sexual epithets directed to her).
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action for "sexual harassment. ",20 Such statements may confuse employ-
ees regarding the scope of Title VII's protection by suggesting that they
must allege sexually motivated conduct to secure a remedy under the
statute. Thus, even substantively correct decisions may obscure the
availability of Title VII as a remedy for non-sexually motivated gender
discrimination in the workplace.
All acts of gender discrimination have the potential to create abusive
working conditions, not just those motivated by sexual desires.
Although the presence of an obviously sexual motive makes it easier to
establish that acts of harassment are based on gender, there is no justifi-
cation for requiring employees to allege such behavior in order to secure
a remedy under Title VII. To the extent that courts apply either an ar-
ticulated or unarticulated distinction between sexual harassment and
gender-based harassment, they restrict the scope of Title VII's protec-
tion. Courts should eliminate any such distinction and explicitly recog-
nize that all forms of gender discrimination may serve as a viable
predicate for hostile work environment actions. Courts should construe
Title VII to provide a remedy for the entire spectrum of unequal treat-
ment suffered by women in the workplace.
Part II of this Note examines the principles underlying the hostile
work environment action and the application of those principles to gen-
der discrimination in the workplace. Part II(A) begins by discussing the
early development of the hostile work environment action in the context
of racial, ethnic, and religious discrimination. This section argues that
the creation of a hostile work environment by an employer is actionable
because a protected "term" of employment, the work atmosphere, has
been poisoned on the basis of an impermissible criterion. Part II(B) dem-
onstrates that the extension 'of the hostile work environment to the gen-
der discrimination context was based on recognition of the "term of
employment" principle-not on the sexual nature of the conduct in-
volved in the leading cases in the area. Part II(C) argues that gender-
based harassment can meet the criteria for an actionable hostile work
environment. Overall, Part II establishes that the theoretical underpin-
nings of the hostile work environment action provide no basis for limit-
ing the remedy to sexual harassment.
Part III examines the current judicial treatment of gender-based
harassment. Part III(A) discusses decisions that do not explicitly recog-
nize that non-sexual as well as sexual forms of gender discrimination are
actionable under Title VII. This section argues that many courts focus
20. See Hall v. Gus Construction Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1013 (8th Cir. 1988); Hicks v. Gates
Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1408 (10th Cir. 1987); McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1131 (D.C.
Cir. 1985) ("sex discrimination/sexual harassment claim").
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on sexual harassment as paradigmatic of a Title VII violation and thus
undervalue claims of gender-based harassment. Part III(B) discusses de-
cisions that have recognized that all forms of gender discrimination are
actionable under Title VII without regard to whether they are sexually
motivated. This section, however, notes an unfortunate lack of clarity in
these opinions. Part IV concludes with a discussion of the ramifications
of recognizing gender-based harassment as a predicate for hostile work
environment claims.
II. UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES OF THE HOSTILE WORK
ENVIRONMENT ACTION AND APPLICATION OF THOSE
PRINCIPLES TO GENDER DISCRIMINATION IN THE
WORK ENVIRONMENT
A. Development of the Hostile Work Environment Action
1. Judicial Recognition. The hostile work environment action
originated in the context of claims of racial, ethnic, and religious discrim-
ination in the workplace. Beginning with Rogers v. EEOC, 21 a number of
lower federal courts recognized that an employer who creates a work
environment rife with racial, ethnic, or religious discrimination violates
Title VII.22 Although these courts did not use uniform terminology in
describing the cause of action they recognized, the essence of each claim
was the same: An employer had subjected an employee to abusive or
offensive working conditions through discrimination based on an imper-
missible criterion.
In Rogers, an Hispanic employee charged that the optometrists for
whom she worked discriminated against her by segregating their patients
on the basis of national origin.23 Although the treatment at issue ap-
peared to be directed primarily at the patients, the court found that the
effect of the segregation policy on the employee was relevant under Title
21. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
22. See Firefighters Institute for Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 515 (8th
Cir.) (city fire department's practice of excluding blacks from informal "supper clubs" violates duty
under Title VII "to provide a nondiscriminatory working environment"), cert denied sub. nom.
Barta v. United States, 434 U.S. 819 (1977); United States v. City of Buffalo, 457 F. Supp. 612, 632-
635 (W.D.N.Y. 1978) (pattern of racial harassment in city's police and fire departments violates
Title VII); Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157, 160-61 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (constant harass-
ment and verbal abuse of Jewish employee by supervisor violates Title VII); Calcote v. Texas Educ.
Found., Inc., 458 F. Supp. 231, 237 (W.D. Tex. 1976) (black supervisor's racial harassment of white
employee creates intolerable working conditions in violation of Title VII), ajf'd, 578 F.2d 95 (5th
Cir. 1978).
23. Rogers, 454 F.2d at 236. The factual record in the case is rather vague, but the employee,
Josephine Chavez, apparently alleged that her employers "classified" their patients in some discrimi-
natory fashion. Id at 238.
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VII.24 Judge Goldberg concluded that "the relationship between an em-
ployee and his [or her] working environment is of such significance as to
be entitled to statutory protection. '25
Judge Goldberg's conclusion represented a significant expansion of
existing Title VII caselaw. Prior to Rogers, most Title VII claims in-
volved traditional "terms" of employment such as hiring, firing, and pro-
motion-aspects of the employment relationship that have tangible
economic effects on employees. 26 The dissent's contention in Rogers that
the segregation policy was a "business practice" and not an "employment
practice" subject to Title VII typifies the prevailing view of the statute.27
Judge Goldberg, however, took a broad view of the "terms and condi-
tions" language of Title VII.
The fundamental proposition of the decision in Rogers, and the un-
derlying premise of the hostile work environment action, is that an em-
ployee's work atmosphere constitutes a protected "term" or "condition"
of employment under Title VII. Thus, Judge Goldberg stated, "the
phrase 'terms, conditions, or privileges of employment' in Section 703
[now section 2000e-2(a)] is an expansive concept which sweeps within its
protective ambit the practice of creating a working environment heavily
charged with ethnic or racial discrimination." 28 This interpretation of
the "terms and conditions" language of Title VII was initially followed
24. The court considered it possible that the policy was "a subtle scheme designed to create a
working environment imbued with discrimination and directed ultimately at minority group employ-
ees." Id at 239. Without resolving the issue of whether the policy was directed at Chavez, the court
determined that the optometrists' "failure to direct intentionally any discriminatory treatment to-
ward Mrs. Chavez is simply not material to the finding of an unlawful employment practice." Id.
The court's reasoning was based upon Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), which Judge
Goldberg viewed as establishing that "the absence of discriminatory intent by an employer does not
redeem an otherwise unlawful employment practice ... the thrust of Title VII's proscriptions is
aimed at the consequences or effects of an employment practice and not at the employer's motiva-
tion." Rogers, 454 F.2d at 239.
25. Rogers, 454 F.2d at 237-38.
26. Judge Goldberg argued that restricting Title VII to traditional economic terms of employ-
ment was inappropriate:
Time was when employment discrimination tended to be viewed as a series of isolated and
distinguishable events, manifesting itself, for example, in an employer's practices of hiring,
firing, and promoting. But today employment discrimination is a far more complex and
pervasive phenomenon, as the nuances and subtleties of discriminatory employment prac-
tices are no longer confined to bread and butter issues. As wages and hours of employment
take subordinate roles in management-labor relationships, the modem employee makes
ever-increasing demands in the nature of intangible fringe benefits. Recognizing the impor-
tance of these benefits, we should neither ignore their need for protection, nor blind our-
selves to their potential misuse.
Id. at 238.
27. Id. at 245 (Roney, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 238.
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by lower federal courts29 and was ultimately validated by the Supreme
Court in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union. 30
The rationale underlying Judge Goldberg's view that the work envi-
ronment is a protected "term" of employment under Title VII is that
"employees' psychological as well as economic fringes are statutorily en-
titled to protection from employer abuse."'31 The Rogers court explained
that "[a]s wages and hours of employment take subordinate roles in man-
agement-labor relationships, the modem employee makes ever-increasing
demands in the nature of intangible fringe benefits. Recognizing the im-
portance of these benefits, we should neither ignore their need for protec-
tion, nor blind ourselves to their potential misuse."' 32 The "work
environment" as a "term" of employment for Title VII purposes can be
loosely defined as a composite of the physical setting and personal rela-
tionships within a workplace. These elements affect an employee's psy-
chological well-being rather than the economic benefits he or she receives
from the employment relationship.
Judge Goldberg justified the extension of Title VII to protect em-
ployees' psychological well-being on the basis of a broad view of congres-
sional intent. He believed the statute was intended to protect non-
economic aspects of the employment relationship and argued, "One can
readily envision working environments so heavily polluted with discrimi-
nation as to destroy completely the emotional and psychological stability
of minority group workers, ... Section [2000e-2(a)(l)] of Title VII was
aimed at the eradication of such noxious practices. '33
29. See United States v. City of Buffalo, 457 F. Supp. 612, 631 (W.D.N.Y. 1978) ("a variety of
employment practices which are related not to economic fringe benefits but to intangibles, such as
psychological impact upon minority employees from a work environment heavily charged with dis-
crimination, fall within the protection of the expansive statutory language"); Calcote v. Texas Educ.
Found., Inc., 458 F. Supp. 231, 237 (W.D. Tex. 1976) ("Racial harassment that [leads] to an em-
ployee's resignation would appear to give rise to a valid claim... under an expansive reading of the
prohibition against discrimination because of race in the 'terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment.' "); see also Friend v. Leidinger, 588 F.2d 61, 68 (4th Cir. 1978) (Butzner, J., dissenting)
("Congress adopted the language concerning terms, conditions, or privileges of employment to as-
sure that Title VII would reach more than hiring, promotion, and firing .... 'mhis language forbids
such conduct as the practice of supervisors calling black employees 'Nigger,' of the employers' toler-
ating ethnic jokes, and of employers' requiring that black employees be addressed in less respectful
terms than white [employees]' ") (quoting CARSON, 3 Employment Discrimination § 84.10 (1977)).
30. 491 U.S. 164, 180 (1989) ("Racial harassment in the course of employment is actionable
under Title VII's prohibition against discrimination in the 'terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment' ").
31. Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238.
32. Id.
33. Id.
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The Supreme Court validated this broad view of congressional in-
tent in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson. 34 In that case, the Court explic-
itly rejected the defendant's contention that in passing Title VII,
"Congress was concerned with... 'tangible loss' of an 'economic charac-
ter,' not 'purely psychological aspects of the workplace environment.' -a3
2. Conduct Actionable Under a Hostile Work Environment Claim.
The initial decisions recognizing the hostile work environment action
stand for the general proposition that a pattern of racial, ethnic, or reli-
gious harassment by an employer violates Title VII.36 The incidents of
harassment involved in those cases fit into three general categories: (1)
unwarranted criticism of employees; (2) efforts to ridicule or humiliate
employees; and (3) the use of discriminatory epithets. Thus, in Lucero v.
Beth Israel Hospital and Geriatric Center, a black supervisor's "almost
continuous criticism of the work of the plaintiffs and other non-blacks"
coupled with racial slurs and other abusive conduct violated Title VII.37
And in Compston v. Borden, Inc., when a supervisor "embark[ed] upon a
course of conduct calculated to demean an employee before his fellows
because of the employee's professed religious views," the statute also was
violated. 38 Finally, the Eighth Circuit recognized in Cariddi v. Kansas
34. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
35. Id. at 64 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 30-31, 34). Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Meritor
identified two sources of authority for the proposition that non-economic aspects of the employment
relationship are protected by Title VII-the language of the statute and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission's (EEOC) interpretation of that language.
Justice Rehnquist initially noted that section 2000e-2(a)(1) of Title VII is not by its terms re-
stricted to either "economic" or "tangible" discrimination. Id. at 64. He then concluded that the
phrase "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" indicates Congress' intent to "'strike at the
entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women' in employment." Id. (quoting Sprogis v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir.) cert denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971)).
The EEOC Guidelines comprised a second basis of support for the proposition that "harass-
ment leading to noneconomic injury can violate Title VII." Id. at 65. The Guidelines state the
EEOC's conclusion that sexual harassment which "has the purpose or effect of unreasonably inter-
fering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work-
ing environment," 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 1(a)(3), is actionable "whether or not it is directly linked to the
grant or denial of an economic quid pro quo." Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65.
36. See Lucero v. Beth Israel Hosp. and Geriatric Center, 479 F. Supp. 452, 454 (D. Colo.
1979) (black supervisor's continual harassment of non-black employees violates Title VII); United
States v. City of Buffalo, 457 F. Supp. 612, 632-35 (W.D.N.Y. 1978) (widespread and egregious
racial harassment of blacks in city's police and fire departments violates Title VII); Compston v.
Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157, 159 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (supervisor's constant harassment and verbal
abuse of Jewish employee violates Title VII); Calcote v. Texas Educ. Found., Inc., 458 F. Supp. 231,
237 (W.D. Tex. 1976) (racial harassment of white employee by black supervisor severe enough to
cause employee to resign violates Title VII); see also Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S.
164, 180 ("Racial harassment in the course of employment is actionable under Title VII's prohibi-
tion against discrimination in the 'terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.' ").
37. 479 F. Supp. 452, 454 (D. Colo. 1979).
38. 424 F. Supp. 157, 160 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
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City Chiefs Football Club, Inc., that "derogatory comments [based on
national origin] could be so excessive and opprobrious as to constitute an
unlawful employment practice under Title VII. '' 39
The conduct at issue in Calcote v. Texas Educational Foundation,
Inc. 40 presented a pattern of racial harassment. In Calcote, a white resi-
dential counselor at a Job Corps Center alleged that a black supervisor
subjected him to persistent discriminatory treatment. The counselor,
Herman Calcote, contended that his supervisor, Ras Dancy, "tried to
frustrate and to harass [him]. ' ' 41 Calcote introduced the testimony of a
former employee that Dancy often "tried to cut down white people." 42
Calcote further alleged that Dancy ridiculed his efforts to help a fellow
employee in a job-related matter, filed a deficiency report on him, talked
down to him, and "frustrate[d] him at every opportunity." 43 The court
held that the Job Corps Center had violated Title VII by permitting
Calcote to be subjected to racial harassment.44
The court's reasoning in Calcote, as in other early cases dealing with
claims of discrimination in the workplace, appears to have been relatively
simple. First, the court found that Dancy's treatment of Calcote consti-
tuted "racial harassment. ' 45 It reached this conclusion on the basis of
evidence, primarily consisting of testimony by the plaintiff and a former
employee, that Dancy harassed white employees but not black employ-
ees. 46 The court then concluded that the pattern of abuse suffered by
Calcote had a significant detrimental impact on his work environment-
indeed, the harassment in that case "made [his] working conditions so
intolerable that [he was] forced to resign."47 These two conclusions sus-
tained a finding of a Title VII violation.
3. Limits of the Hostile Work Environment Action. The foregoing
discussion demonstrates that the hostile work environment action poten-
39. 568 F.2d 87, 88 (8th Cir. 1977); see also City of Buffalo, 457 F. Supp. at 635 (racial slurs);
Compston, 424 F. Supp. at 158 (epithets based on religion).
40. 458 F. Supp. 231 (W.D. Tex. 1976).
41. Id. at 235.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 237.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. The court concluded that the Job Corps center had "constructively discharged"
Calcote. Id. at 238. Although the constructive discharge of an employee has a tangible, economic
impact on that employee, it is ultimately the product of forces acting on an employee's psychological
well-being. Thus, constructive discharge claims are well-suited to analysis as hostile work environ-
ment actions.
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tially proscribes an extremely wide range of employer conduct.4 How-
ever, although the courts that initially recognized this action viewed Title
VII as providing protection for an employee's psychological well-being,
they did not view such protection as absolute. Judge Goldberg articu-
lated the following limit on the hostile work environment action in Rog-
ers: "[A]n employer's mere utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet which
engenders offensive feelings in an employee" would not violate the stat-
ute.49 In addition, the cases above all involved persistent discriminatory
treatment by employers, not isolated incidents.
Judge Goldberg's statement and the fact patterns of the early hostile
work environment cases indicate that the hostile work environment ac-
tion is intended to remedy only serious injuries to an employee's psycho-
logical well-being. Conduct that is not sufficiently intrusive upon an
employee's psyche is not actionable. Thus, while a pattern of racial or
ethnic epithets might be actionable, the isolated utterance of a discrimi-
natory slur is not. For example, in Cariddi, a supervisor's occasional
references to Italian-American employees as "dagos" and "Mafia" were
insufficient to violate Title VII.5O
The early cases recognizing the hostile work environment action es-
tablish two requisites for proof of a Title VII violation. First, the treat-
ment complained of must be based upon a proscribed criterion. This
requirement is mandated by the language of Title VII, which prohibits
discrimination "because of [an] individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin." Second, the discriminatory treatment alleged must pro-
duce a significant detrimental impact on an .employee's worldng condi-
tions. All harassment predicated upon race, religion, sex, or national
origin carries the potential to wound an employee's psyche. Proof of im-
properly motivated conduct, however, is by itself insufficient to state a
48. In Rogers, Judge Goldberg turned to the language of Title VII to justify the application of
the statute to a broad range of employer conduct. He concluded that the decision not to define the
term "discrimination" with specificity manifested a "Congressional intention to define discrimina-
tion in the broadest possible terms. Congress chose neither to enumerate specific discriminatory
practices, nor to elucidate in extenso the parameter of such nefarious activities." Rogers v. EEOC,
454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971). Judge Goldberg also relied on the purposes of the statute as a
source of authority for giving Title VII an expansive scope. He argued that "Title VII... should be
accorded a liberal interpretation in order to effectuate the purpose of Congress to eliminate the
inconvenience, unfairness, and humiliation of ethnic discrimination." Id.
49. Id. at 238. However, Judge Goldberg was obviously "not willing to hold that a discrimina-
tory atmosphere could under no set of circumstances ever constitute an unlawful employment prac-
tice." Id.
50. 568 F.2d 87, 87 (8th Cir. 1977). See also Friend v. Leidinger, 588 F.2d 61 (4th Cir, 1978)
(finding that isolated incidents of racial harassment established by black firefighters did not violate
Title VII).
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violation of Title VII. An employee must further demonstrate that such
conduct has poisoned his or her work environmeit.
B. Extension of the Hostile Work Environment Action to Claims of
Gender Discrimination in the Workplace
1. Leading Cases Involve Egregious Sexual Harassment. Gender
discrimination, as well as racial and ethnic discrimination, can obviously
poison an employee's working conditions. The first cases to charge that
gender discrimination in the workplace had created a hostile work envi-
ronment were sexual harassment suits brought by female employees
against their employers. In Bundy v. Jackson 51 and Henson v. City of
Dundee, 5 2 the D.C. Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit, respectively, held
that an employee possesses a cause of action under Title VII for a hostile
work environment created by sexual harassment. The Supreme Court
subsequently affirmed the validity of this cause of action in Meritor Sav-
ings Bank v. Vinson. 53
Meritor, Bundy, and Henson, the leading cases on gender discrimi-
nation in the work environment, all involved egregious acts of harass-
ment that were clearly sexually motivated.5 4 In Meritor, as detailed
above,55 the plaintiff alleged that her supervisor subjected her to a three-
year pattern of sexual abuse. In Bundy v. Jackson, a female vocational
rehabilitation specialist at the District of Columbia Department of Cor-
rections alleged that sexual harassment by her supervisors and co-work-
ers created a hostile work environment.5 6 The plaintiff, Sandra Bundy,
claimed that both her first-line and second-line supervisors repeatedly
propositioned her, both requesting that she join them for sexual liai-
sons.57 When Bundy complained about this conduct to a higher level
supervisor, he allegedly told her that, "any man in his right mind would
want to rape you,"5 8 and then himself requested that she engage in a
sexual relationship with him.59 The district court entered findings of fact
that "'the making of improper sexual advances to female employees
51. 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
52. 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
53. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). See supra text accompanying note 9.
54. Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983), another leading case on gender discrimination
in the work environment, involved both sexually-motivated behavior and conduct of a sexual nature.
See supra note 19.
55. See supra text accompanying note 11.
56. She also alleged an instance ofquidpro quo harassment, supra note 8, contending that she
was denied promotions on the basis of her rejection of sexual advances by her supervisors. Bundy v.
Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
57. Id. at 940.
58. Id. (quoting district court Finding of Fact No. 37, Appendix to Appellant's Brief at 14).
59. Id. (citing district court Finding of Fact No. 36, Appendix to Appellant's Brief at 14).
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[was] standard operating procedure, a fact of life, a normal condition of
employment," 60 in Bundy's office and that "sexual intimidation was
[also] a 'normal condition of employment' "61 for her.62
Henson v. City of Dundee also involved allegations of egregious sex-
ual harassment in the workplace. 63 In Henson, a female police dis-
patcher claimed that the chief of police subjected her to "numerous
harangues of demeaning sexual inquiries and vulgarities" over the two
years she was employed at the department.64 The plaintiff also alleged
that the police chief made repeated requests for sexual favors during this
period.65
2. Leading Decisions Based on Principles Developed in Early Hos-
tile Work Environment Cases. Rogers and other cases recognized that
the creation of a hostile work environment by an employer violates Title
VII for two reasons: (1) the employer has engaged in discrimination on
the basis of a proscribed criterion; (2) this discrimination has had a sig-
nificant detrimental impact on a protected term of employment, the work
atmosphere.66 The cause of action recognized in Bundy, Henson, and
Meritor, was based on these principles, not on the sexual nature of the
conduct involved in those cases. The reasoning of each of these decisions
parallels that of Judge Goldberg's opinion in Rogers and reflects a pri-
mary concern with the effect of sexual harassment on an employee's
working conditions-not with the evils of sexual harassment per se.
The D.C. Circuit's decision in Bundy demonstrates the influence of
the principles established in prior hostile work environment caselaw. In
his opinion in Bundy, Judge Skelly Wright first turned to the question of
whether the plaintiff was discriminated against on the basis of a pro-
scribed criterion. He noted that in determining whether a plaintiff has
been discriminated against "because of sex"' within the meaning of Title
VII, "the question is one of but-for causation: would the complaining
60. Id. at 939 (quoting Finding of Fact No. 38, Appellant's Appendix at 15).
61. Id.
62. Nevertheless, the district court refused to grant relief to Bundy because it concluded that
sexual harassment was not discrimination with respect to the "terms, conditions, or privileges" of
employment. Id. at 939.
63. 682 F.2d 897, 899-900 (11th Cir. 1982). In addition to a hostile work environment claim,
the plaintiff brought claims of constructive discharge and quid pro quo sexual harassment. She al-
leged that the chief of police prevented her from attending the local police academy because of her
refusal to submit to his sexual advances.
64. Ia at 899. The plaintiff contended that the chief of police forced her and a co-worker to
endure "crude and vulgar language, almost daily inquiring of these two women employees as to their
sexual habits and proclivities." Id. at 900-01.
65. Id.
66. See supra text accompanying note 50.
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employee have suffered the harassment had he or she been of a different
gender?" 67 "But for" causation, however, does not require that gender
be the sole factor behind an employer's behavior: "[D]iscrimination is
sex discrimination whenever sex is for no legitimate reason a substantial
factor in the discrimination. ' 68 Because Bundy's supervisors did not
subject male employees to the same treatment she endured, the court had
"no difficulty inferring that Bundy suffered discrimination on the basis of
sex."
69
Finding the existence of an impermissible motive, Judge Skelly
Wright next turned to the issue of whether the work environment consti-
tutes a protected "term" of employment under Title VII. He stated:
What remains is the novel question whether the sexual harassment of
the sort Bundy suffered amounted by itself to sex discrimination with
respect to the "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment."
Though no court has as yet so held, we believe that an affirmative an-
swer follows ineluctably from numerous cases finding Title VII viola-
tions where an employer created or condoned a substantially
discriminatory work environment, regardless of whether the com-
plaining employees lost any tangible job benefits as the result of the
discrimination.70
Judge Skelly Wright's opinion in Bundy quotes Judge Goldberg's opinion
in Rogers at length and cites much of the existing hostile work environ-
ment caselaw.71
The decision in Bundy reflects a recognition that sexual harassment
that creates a hostile work environment is actionable because of its im-
67. Bundy, 641 F.2d at 942 n.7 (citing Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 900 n.55 (D.C.Cir.
1977)); see also Henson, 682 F.2d at 904 (proof of a hostile work environment claim requires the
plaintiff to show that "but for the fact of her sex, she would not have been the object of harass-
ment"). In Barnes, the D.C. Circuit concluded that a male supervisor made sexual demands of a
female employee that he did not make of male employees. Barnes, 561 F.2d at 988. The Bundy
Court noted, "But for her womanhood .... [Barnes'] participation in sexual activity would never
have been solicited." Bundy, 641 F.2d at 942. (quoting Barnes, 561 F.2d at 990) (emphasis added by
Bundy court) (footnotes omitted).
68. Bundy, 641 F.2d at 942.
69. Id. at 943. The Eleventh Circuit noted in Henson that sexual harassment generally facially
constitutes discrimination "because of sex":
In the typical case in which a male supervisor makes sexual overtures to a female worker, it
is obvious that the supervisor did not treat male employees in a similar fashion. It will
therefore be a simple matter for the plaintiff to prove that but for her sex, she would not
have been subjected to sexual harassment.
682 F.2d at 904 (citation omitted).
, 70. Bundy, 641 F.2d at 943-44. The Eleventh Circuit quoted this language in Henson. 682
F.2d at 902.
71. Bundy, 641 F.2d at 944-45. See also Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-66
(1986) (quoting Rogers and endorsing the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's applica-
tion of existing hostile work environment caselaw in the context of race, religion, and national origin
to harassment based on sex); Henson, 682 F.2d at 901 (citing Rogers and other hostile work environ-
ment cases).
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pact on the psychological well-being of female employees, a protected
"term" of employment. Judge Skelly Wright argued that Title VII pros-
cribes sexual harassment because it "injects the most demeaning sexual
stereotypes into the general work environment and... always represents
an intentional assault on an individual's innermost privacy."' 72 In addi-
tion, the Eleventh Circuit in Henson reasoned:
Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment for
members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality
at the workplace that racial harassment is to racial equality. Surely, a
requirement that a man or,woman run a gauntlet of sexual abuse in
return for the privilege of being allowed to work and make a living can
be as demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest of racial epithets.73
The implication of these statements is that sexual harassment is ac-
tionable because in damaging an employee's psyche it intrudes on a pro-
tected aspect of the employment relationship. The discussion below
further demonstrates that employees only have a remedy for sexual har-
assment when it produces a significant effect on their working conditions.
3. A New Limit on Hostile Work Environment Actions: The "Se-
vere or Pervasive" Requirement. The first cases to recognize the hostile
work environment claim, as noted above, limited the availability of the
action to conduct by an employer that had a significant detrimental im-
pact on an employee's working conditions.74 This limit, although clearly
apparent from Judge Goldberg's "mere utterance" statement 7s and the
fact patterns of the early cases in this area, was quite nebulous. Henson
contributed significantly to the development of the hostile work environ-
ment action by articulating a new standard for evaluating whether dis-
crimination by an employer had produced a significant enough impact on
an employee's working conditions to be actionable under Title VII. The
Eleventh Circuit stated, "For sexual harassment to state a claim under
Title VII, it must be sufficiently pervasive so as to alter the conditions of
employment and create an abusive working environment. ' 76 Justice
Rehnquist adopted this standard in his opinion in Meritor, restating it
slightly: "For sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently
severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment
and create an abusive working environment.' ",77 The articulation of the
72. Bundy, 641 F.2d at 945. Indeed, Bundy testified that the sexual harassment by her supervi-
sors caused her serious emotional harm. Id. at 942.
73. Henson, 682 F.2d at 902.
74. See supra text accompanying note 49.
75. See id.
76. Henson, 682 F.2d at 904.
77. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 904).
The Henson-Meritor articulation of the limit on hostile work environment actions represents a subtle
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"severe and pervasive" standard by the Eleventh Circuit and the
Supreme Court confirms that the core function of the hostile work envi-
ronment action is to protect an employee's working conditions. Despite
the affront to individual dignity inherent in sexual harassment, such con-
duct is not actionable per se. Absent "severe and pervasive" harassment
that alters the conditions of employment, an employee has no remedy for
sexual harassment.
Many courts have failed to realize that the action recognized in
Bundy, Henson, and Meritor affords specific protection to an employee's
work environment. Courts tend to focus primarily on the question of
whether an employee has been victimized by sexual harassment. 78 Such
an analysis misconceives the cause of action recognized in these cases.
These decisions recognize an action "for" the creation of a hostile work
environment on the basis of sexual harassment, not an action "for" sex-
ual harassment per se. The difference is real rather than semantic. The
rationale of Meritor and the decisions that came before it is that an em-
ployee has a remedy for all impermissibly motivated discrimination that
poisons the work environment. These decisions thus do not stand for the
proposition that the hostile work environment action is limited to sexual
harassment.
C. Gender-Based Harassment and the Requirements for an Actionable
Hostile Work Environment
Courts have yet to hold clearly and uniformly that a pattern of gen-
der-based harassment alone constitutes a sufficient predicate for a hostile
work environment action.79 Suppose a male employer constantly criti-
cizes the personalities, opinions, and work of female employees, but not
shift from Rogers Rogers viewed the work environment itself as a protected "term" of employment.
See supra text accompanying note 28. Discrimination "with respect to" the work environment was
proscribed by Title VII if it rose to a certain level. See supra text accompanying note 49. In
Meritor, however, Justice Rehnquist stated, "[A]s the courts in both Rogers and Henson recognized,
not all workplace conduct that may be described as 'harassment' affects a 'term, condition, or privi-
lege' of employment within the meaning of Title VII." Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67. At least as far as
Rogers is concerned, this statement appears to be slightly inaccurate-under the Rogers analysis de
minimis harassment would affect a "term" of employment, the work environment, but would not be
sufficiently significant to violate Title VII. Justice Rehnquist's approach appears to indicate that
only harassment which is "severe or pervasive" enough to itself become a "condition" of employ-
ment is actionable under the statute.
Whether this shift is of any practical significance is unclear. It is possible, however, that a
requirement that a plaintiff prove that discrimination is itself a "condition" of employment will
prove more difficult to meet than a simple requirement that discrimination be "severe or pervasive."
78. See Dwyer v. Smith, 867 F.2d 184 (4th Cir. 1989), discussed supra text accompanying note
13.
79. See H. KAY, SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION 535 (1988) (Asking, "Can a plaintiff establish a
hostile environment sexual harassment claim in the absence of overt sexual advances?").
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those of male employees; he regularly belittles women with comments
such as "you can't do half the job men can" and "you should stay in the
kitchen," and repeatedly uses derogatory epithets such as "bitch" in re-
ferring to female employees, but never touches or propositions any fe-
male employee. Is such an employer even potentially liable under Title
VII? The answer, according to the principles underlying the hostile
work environment action, is yes. The absence of a sexual motive is not
equivalent to the absence of either (1) discrimination "because of sex" or
(2) harassment so "severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions" of
employment.
1. Discrimination "'Because of Sex." The proposition that dis-
crimination by an employer may be motivated by gender, but not by sex-
ual desires is an obvious one. In the hypothetical above, for example, the
employer's behavior may be accounted for by either fervent chauvinism
or misogyny. The real difficulty for employees who face such treatment
is to prove that an employer's behavior is motivated by gender. Although
determining the motivations behind an employer's behavior is certainly
difficult, it is not impossible and it is a task in which courts must engage.
Title VII proscribes discrimination "because of sex"-courts have no au-
thority to limit the reach of the statute to discrimination "because of
sexual desires." '80
The D.C. Circuit in McKinney v. Dole81 found it appropriate to
evaluate the motives behind a "physically aggressive but not explicitly
sexual act by a male supervisor against a female employee" 82 under the
"but for" causation test described above.83 In McKinney, a budget ana-
lyst for the Federal Aviation Administration brought a claim of sex dis-
crimination alleging that her second-line supervisor had verbally abused
her, exposed himself to her, fondled her, and requested sexual favors
from her. In addition, she contended that in a dispute over an impending
furlough, the supervisor grabbed her arm and twisted it in an effort to
prevent her from leaving her office.84 The plaintiff alleged that she suf-
fered physical injury from this confrontation. 85
80. The "because of sex"/sexual problem does not appear with regard to discrimination based
on factors other than gender. The problem in the gender area arises at least partially because the
term "sexual" has a meaning other than "relating to gender;" it can also mean "relating to erotic
desires." This problem does not arise, for example, in the context of the terms "race" and "racial."
81. 765 F.2d 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
82. Id. at 1131.
83. See supra text accompanying note 67.
84. McKinney, 765 F.2d at 1132.
85. Id.
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The D.C. Circuit focused on whether this incident could constitute
part of a pattern of discrimination based on sex. The district court had
granted summary judgment for the defendant, assuming that "an inci-
dent of physical force toward an employee by a supervisor cannot consti-
tute sexual discrimination or harassment unless it is for the purpose of
obtaining sexual favors or is otherwise blatantly sexually oriented."' 86
The D.C. Circuit reversed, holding that "any harassment or other une-
qual treatment of an employee or group of employees that would not
occur but for the sex of the employee or employees may, if sufficiently
patterned or pervasive, comprise an illegal condition of employment
under Title VII. '"87
In the context of sexual harassment, the "but for" test can generally
be applied by asking whether employers who make sexual advances to-
ward women also make such advances toward men.8 8 Where harassment
by an employer is not overtly sexual, however, difficulties arise with this
mode of analysis. Courts can certainly ask whether an employer who
criticizes and belittles women also subjects men to the same treatment.
However, conduct such as that engaged in by the hypothetical employer
above may flow from motivations other than gender. The employer sim-
ply may dislike a particular employee or the employee's job performance
may warrant criticism.
Much of Title VII jurisprudence is devoted to determining the real
motivations of employers in such circumstances. When employees allege
that illegal discrimination has motivated a hiring, firing, or promotion
decision, courts apply a system of shifting burdens of production to de-
termine the factual question of whether the employer acted on the basis
of a proscribed criterion. This system, developed in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, requires the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination by showing "(i) that he belongs to a racial [or other pro-
tected] minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which
the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications,
he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained
open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of
complainant's qualifications. ' 89 The prima facie case raises an inference
86. Id. at 1138. Despite the court's use of the phrase "sexual discrimination or harassment," it
is clear that Judge Skelly Wright was referring to discrimination "because of sex" in the sense of
gender. See id. (quoting Title VII's "because of... sex" language); see also infra text accompanying
note 98.
87. McKinney, 765 F.2d at 1138 (emphasis added).
88. See supra note 69.
89. 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
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of unlawful discrimination by the employer. 90 The employer may rebut
this inference by articulating a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason"
for the decision at issue.91 Finally, the plaintiff has the opportunity to
prove that the articulated reasons were not the "true reasons [for the
decision], but were a pretext for discrimination. 92
Courts could apply some version of the McDonnell Douglas test to
determine whether harassment by an employer that affects an employee's
work environment as opposed to the economic conditions of her employ-
ment is based on gender. Whatever the precise test applied, the moreimportant point is that employees must be afforded the opportunity to
prove that harassment that is not overtly sexual is nonetheless motivated
by gender. As the D.C. Circuit noted in McKinney,
[P]roving that a pattern of physical force is illegally discriminatory
might be significantly more difficult than proving that a pattern of ex-
plicitly sexual advances is illegally discriminatory because the latter
are more obviously caused by the sex of the employee. That, however,
is simply an evidentiary problem going to one factual component of
discrimination. '93
In the context of employment decisions affecting tangible economic bene-
fits, courts impose no requirement that a decision be sexually motivated
before an employee may secure a Title VII remedy. They should not do
so in the context of allegations of gender discrimination affecting the
work environment.
Analogies from the race discrimination context also support this
view. Employees alleging that they have been discriminated against on
the basis of race are not denied an opportunity to seek a remedy simply
because ascertaining an employer's motives is difficult. Thus, in Calcote
v. Texas Educational Foundation, Inc., 94 the plaintiff alleged that a pat-
tern of harassment that affected his work environment was based on race.
Despite the employer's ability to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason
for the treatment-it claimed that the supervisor perpetrating the harass-
ment was critical of all employees regardless of their race95 -the court
was able to conclude that the conduct in question was racially moti-
90. See Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (the prima facie case "raises an
inference of discrimination only because we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more
likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible factors"); Texas Dep't of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).
91. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802.
92. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs, 450 U.S. at 253 (citation omitted). The burden of proof
of impermissibly motivated discrimination remains at all times with the plaintiff. Id.
93. 765 F.2d 1129, 1139 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
94. 458 F. Supp. 231 (W.D. Texas 1976). See supra text accompanying notes 40-47.
95. Id. at 235.
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vated.96 Employees who allege that they have been discriminated against
on the basis of gender rather than race should have the same opportunity
to prove claims of impermissibly motivated discrimination.
2. Effect on Working Conditions. The proposition that non-sexu-
ally motivated gender discrimination may be so "severe or pervasive as to
alter the conditions" of employment also appears to be an obvious one.
Thus, the D.C. Circuit recognized in McKinney that "if a supervisor con-
sistently uses physical force toward an employee because of that em-
ployee's sex, the use of such force may, if pervasive enough, form an
illegal 'condition of employment.' ",97 Courts should not assume that
only sexual harassment can destroy employees' psychological well-being.
"[T]he relevant legal question" is whether gender-motivated harassment,
sexually motivated or not, is "sufficiently patterned or pervasive, [to]
comprise an illegal condition of employment under Title VII. ' 98
Gender-based harassment such as that engaged in by the hypotheti-
cal employer above can clearly rise to this level. Analogies from early
hostile work environment cases in the context of racial, ethnic, and reli-
gious discrimination are again instructive on this point. In Calcote, for
example, a supervisor constantly criticized an employee, ridiculed him,
and harassed him in other ways.99 The court found that these acts of
harassment had such a serious impact on the employee's working condi-
tions that he was forced to resign. 100 The holding in Calcote is not, of
course, unique. Many other decisions found that patterns of racial, eth-
nic, or religious harassment-bearing close similarities to the pattern of
gender-based harassment hypothesized above-were sufficiently severe
intrusions on the work environment to violate Title VII. 10
1
The determination of whether a pattern of gender-based harassment
has a sufficiently serious impact on an employee's working conditions to
violate Title VII is necessarily fact-specific. The important point here, as
above, is that employees should be afforded an opportunity to prove that
acts of gender-based harassment have been "severe or pervasive" intru-
sions on their work environments. The nature of an employer's conduct,
96. Id. at 237.
97. McKinney, 765 F.2d at 1139.
98. Id. at 1138.
99. 458 F. Supp. at 237. See supra text accompanying note 93.
100. Calcote, 458 F. Supp. at 237.
101. See Lucero v. Beth Israel Hosp. and Geriatric Center, 479 F. Supp. 452, 454 (D. Colo.
1979) (black supervisor's continual harassment of non-black employees violates Title VII); United
States v. City of Buffalo, 457 F. Supp. 612, 632-35 (W.D.N.Y. 1978) (widespread and egregious
racial harassment of blacks in city's police and fire departments violates Title VII); Compston v.
Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157, 159 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (supervisor's constant harassment and verbal
abuse of Jewish employee violates Title VII).
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sexual or non-sexual, is not dispositive of the severity or pervasiveness of
gender discrimination in the workplace.
III. CURRENT JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF GENDER-BASED
HARASSMENT
At present, it is simply not clear whether all courts recognize that
gender discrimination in the workplace is actionable without regard to
the presence of a sexual motive. The judicial treatment of allegations of
gender-based harassment has been both inconsistent and ambiguous. A
basic division in the caselaw exists between decisions explicitly recogniz-
ing that gender-based harassment is actionable and decisions manifesting
no such recognition. Unfortunately, both lines of authority present diffi-
culties for employees who are the victims of non-sexually motivated gen-
der discrimination in the workplace.
Those decisions, such as Dwyer v. Smith, 102 which manifest no ex-
plicit recognition that gender-based harassment is actionable, have the
most disturbing implications. Because such decisions are silent on the
issue of whether gender-based harassment is actionable, it is impossible
to definitively determine those courts' views on the subject. However, an
analysis of the reasoning in these cases suggests a tendency to seriously
undervalue claims of gender-based harassment. Many courts view egre-
gious sexual harassment as the paradigm of a Title VII hostile work envi-
ronment violation.10 3  When a hostile work environment claim is
predicated on acts of gender-based harassment, these courts tend to find
that such conduct has an insufficient effect on working conditions to vio-
late Title VII.104 At best, such decisions simply obscure the availability
102. 867 F.2d 184 (4th Cir. 1989). See supra text accompanying notes 13-18.
103. See Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210, 214 (7th Cir. 1986) (comparing plaintiffs
allegations to conduct involved in Meritor, Henson, and Bundy); Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co.,
Inc., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986) (discussed infra text accompanying notes 130-42), cert denied, 481
U.S. 1041(1987); Miller v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 679 F. Supp. 495, 502 (W.D. Pa. 1988) (noting
that explicit propositions, the use of sexual epithets, or offensive physical contact is generally re-
quired for a finding of a hostile work environment), affid, 856 F.2d 184 (3rd Cir. 1988); Wimberley
v. Shoney's, Inc., 39 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 444, 453 (S.D. Ga. 1985) (denying a hostile work
environment claim, arguing that "[iln the three leading cases on sexually hostile working environ-
ments [Henson, Katz Bundy], only shocking and pervasive sexually oriented misconduct amounted
to a Title VII violation, not isolated incidents, mere epithets, or flirtation.").
104. See Downum v. City of Wichita, 675 F. Supp. 1566, 1570 (D. Kan. 1986) (belittling and
offensive comments directed to female firefighter comprise "fairly insignificant part of the total job
environment"); Rabidue, 805 F.2d 611 (discussed infra text accompanying notes 130-42); Downes v.
FAA, 775 F.2d 288 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (discussed infra note 147); Hallquist v. Max Fish Plumbing &
Heating Co., Inc., 46 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1855, 1860 (D. Mass. 1987) (evidence that
plaintiff "was the subject of gender-related jokes and occasional teasing ... when offered alone to
establish a claim under a hostile work environment theory, is insufficient."), affd sub nom. Hallquist
v. Local 276 Plumbers and Pipefitters Union, 843 F.2d 18 (1st Cir. 1988); Miller, 679 F. Supp. at
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of the hostile work environment remedy for gender-based harassment; at
worst, they unduly restrict employees' statutory rights. To the extent
that courts treat gender-based harassment as a relatively minor intrusion
on the work environment, they effectively render employers immune
from liability for non-sexually motivated gender discrimination.
The second major category of caselaw consists of decisions expressly
recognizing that gender discrimination in the work environment is ac-
tionable without regard to the presence of a sexual motive. Although
recognition of this principle is, of course, a significant step, certain as-
pects of these decisions remain problematic. These decisions continue to
state that employees possess a cause of action for "sexual harassment."
°10 5
In addition, these cases generally involve acts of gender-based harass-
ment occurring in larger patterns of sexual harassment.10 6 The combina-
tion of these two factors may lead potential litigants to believe that they
must allege acts of sexual harassment in order to succeed on a hostile
work environment claim. Thus, even these substantively correct deci-
sions may not effectively render employers liable, for gender-based
harassment.
A. Decisions Manifesting No Explicit Recognition that Gender-Based
Harassment is Actionable
1. Possible Rationales. Dwyer v. Smith, 10 7 discussed in the intro-
duction to this Note,108 rejected a female police officer's claim that her
employer had subjected her to a hostile work environment. The plaintiff
alleged that she was the victim of gender-motivated behavior that con-
tained sexual overtones, but did not allege that she was sexually
harassed.109 Neither the district court nor the Fourth Circuit in Dwyer
explicitly indicated whether it viewed the plaintiff's allegations as action-
able under Title VII. Three explanations are possible for the conclusion
502 ("Snubs and unjust criticisms of one's work are not poisonous enough to create an actionable
hostile work environment.").
105. See Hall v. Gus Const. Co., Inc., 842 F.2d 1010, 1013 (8th Cir. 1988); Hicks v. Gates
Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1413 (10th Cir. 1987); McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1131 (D.C.
Cir. 1985) (describing action as one for "sex discrimination/sexual harassment").
106. See Hall, 842 F.2d at 1012 (female traffic controllers for construction company allege vari-
ous acts of gender-based harassment along with allegations that male construction workers repeat-
edly requested sexual favors from them, exposed themselves, engaged in offensive physical touchings,
and inflicted "verbal sexual abuse" on them); Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1409-10 (allegation of gender-based
intimidation along with allegation of offensive physical touchings); McKinney, 765 F.2d at 1131
(allegation of use of force against female employee in context of allegations of "sexual advances and
other sexual importunings" by male supervisors).
107. 867 F.2d 184 (4th Cir. 1989).
108. See supra text accompanying notes 13-18.
109. See supra text accompanying note 14.
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reached by both courts that the plaintiff "failed to establish a prima facie
claim of sexual harassment": 110 (1) Both courts may have recognized
that gender-based harassment is actionable, but simply have found that
the plaintiff failed to prove her case; (2) both courts may have viewed
gender-based harassment as non-actionable under Title VII; (3) both
courts may have viewed gender-based harassment as technically actiona-
ble, but as relatively insignificant.
Turning to the first possibility, the district court and the Fourth Cir-
cuit may have in fact recognized that gender discrimination in the work-
place is actionable in the absence of a sexual motive, but simply failed to
articulate that conclusion. Both courts may have ruled against Dwyer
based on evidentiary insufficiency, believing either that her claims were
untrue or that she did not establish that her employer's conduct rose to
the level of a hostile work environment. In light of each court's focus on
the existence of sexual harassment, however, this explanation is not
compelling.
The statements of both courts regarding the evidence offered by
Dwyer reveal a primary concern with the existence of sexual harassment.
In considering the plaintiff's claims, the district court did find that
Dwyer failed to establish who sent certain of the mailings she received
and also found that certain objectionable "art work" in the stationhouse
was placed there by a female co-worker."l' However, the district court
also apparently rejected certain claims of Dwyer because "no sexual lan-
guage was ever directed at [her]; that only one of the mailings could be
considered pornographic;... and that two female police officers testified
that sexual harassment did not exist in the [department]." 12 The Fourth
Circuit relied on these findings and further noted that Dwyer had not
alleged any "suggestive behavior" on the part of her supervisor.' 1 3 The
district court ultimately concluded that "[tihe only credible evidence that
I find is that perhaps on occasion there has been inappropriate language
and inappropriate references made to sex, but not harassment."' 14
At the very least, the focus of these courts on sexual harassment
injects significant ambiguity into their conclusions about the sufficiency
of Dwyer's evidence. Did the district court mean that Dwyer was not
harassed at all or did it mean that she was not sexually harassed? Was
her claim rejected because the character of the acts she complained of
was not "sexual" or "suggestive" or because she did not prove that they
110. Dwyer, 867 F.2d at 188.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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had a significant effect on her working conditions t 15 More significantly,
however, the focus of both courts on sexual harassment and the lack of
sexually motivated behavior strongly suggests that neither court viewed
gender-based harassment as actionable per se. If derogatory terms were
directed at Dwyer because she was a woman, if offensive and intimidat-
ing mailings were sent to her because she was a woman, or if her supervi-
sors otherwise demeaned her because she was a woman, the absence of
sexual content in these actions was entirely irrelevant. Any court that
recognized the irrelevance of a sexual motive would have no reason to
focus upon it so extensively.
If the district court and the Fourth Circuit did not view gender-
based harassment as actionable per se, did they view it as entirely irrele-
vant under Title VII? A second explanation for the decisions in Dwyer is
that neither court viewed the plaintiff's allegations of gender-based har-
assment as actionable. Although this account of the decisions is indeed
plausible, it does not explain why either court discussed Dwyer's claims
at length as opposed to simply dismissing the action.
The most plausible explanation of Dwyer is that the two courts
viewed the plaintiff's allegations as actionable only insofar as they could
be pigeonholed into the category of "sexual harassment." The Fourth
Circuit began its account of Dwyer's action by stating, "[Plaintiff] con-
tends that.., her work life has been rife with innuendo, disparagement,
humiliation and insinuation-in short, sexual harassment.1 16 But
Dwyer nowhere claimed that she was the victim of sexual harassment.
Not only did she not allege any sexually motivated behavior, but much of
the "disparagement" and "humiliation" she claimed to have suffered was
free even of sexual overtones. Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit insisted
on forcing Dwyer's claim under the rubric of "sexual harassment."
This explanation of Dwyer suggests that although both courts may
have viewed gender-based harassment as technically actionable, they also
viewed it as relatively insignificant. Both courts appear to have treated
sexual harassment as a powerful force capable of destroying an em-
ployee's psychological well-being. Gender-based harassment, even
though "inappropriate," did not represent nearly as serious an invasion
of an employee's working conditions. Thus, Dwyer's allegation that her
115. The ambiguity in both opinions is further demonstrated by the Fourth Circuit's statement
that, "[the district court rejected Dwyer's Title VII claim of sexual harassment, finding that she
failed to present any evidence of sexual harassment that altered the conditions of her employment
and created an abusive working environment." Id. at 187. It is simply not clear whether the court
meant that Dwyer failed to present specific evidence of sexual harassment or that she failed to pro-
vide evidence of gender discrimination in general.
116. Id. at 187-88 (emphasis added).
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supervisor consistently treated her like a "problem child" was not as sig-
nificant as would have been an allegation that he engaged in "suggestive
behavior" toward her.117 It appears that because Dwyer's claims of hu-
miliation and ridicule did not constitute sexual harassment, neither the
district court nor the Fourth Circuit viewed these actions as capable of
creating a hostile work environment. Dwyer's failure to allege sexually
motivated behavior thus effectively deprived her of a remedy under Title
VIL
2. Sexual Harassment as the Paradigm of a Title VII Violation.
Many courts treat egregious sexual harassment as the paradigm of a Title
VII hostile work environment violation. 118 Thus, in Rabidue v. Osceola
Refining Co., 119 the most influential hostile work environment case de-
cided since Meritor, the Sixth Circuit viewed "sexual propositions, offen-
sive touchings, [and] sexual conduct of a similar nature . .
systematically directed to the plaintiff over a protracted period of time"
as a standard against which to evaluate claims of gender discrimination
in the workplace.' 20 The Sixth Circuit's focus on conduct of a sexual
nature was primarily a product of its reliance on two sources: the fact
patterns of such leading decisions as Bundy v. Jackson, 121 Henson v. City
of Dundee, 122 and Katz v. Dole, 123 and the EEOC Guidelines on Discrim-
ination Because of Sex.' 24
Rabidue concerned a claim by a female employee at the Osceola
Refining Company that she was subjected to a hostile work environment
on the basis of her gender. The plaintiff, Vivienne Rabidue, alleged that
one of the company's supervisors, 125 Douglas Henry, continually made
obscene comments about women and sometimes directed these com-
117. Id. at 188.
118. See Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210, 214 (7th Cir. 1986) (comparing plaintiffs
allegations to conduct involved in Menitor, Henson, and Bundy); Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co.,
Inc., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986) (discussed infra text accompanying notes 130-42); Miller v. Alu-
minum Co. of Am., 679 F. Supp. 495, 502 (W.D. Pa. 1988) (noting that explicit propositions, the use
of sexual epithets, or offensive physical contact is generally required for a finding of a hostile work
environment); Wimberley v. Shoney's, Inc., 39 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 444, 453 (S.D. Ga.
1985) (court denies a hostile work environment claim, arguing that "[i]n the three leading cases on
sexually hostile working environments [Henson, Katz Bundy], only shocking and pervasive sexually
oriented misconduct amounted to a Title VII violation, not isolated incidents, mere epithets, or
flirtation.").
119. 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986).
120. Id. at 622 n.7.
121. 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981). See supra text accompanying notes 56-62.
122. 682 F.2d 897 (1lth Cir. 1982). See supra text accompanying notes 63-65.
123. 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983). See supra note 19.
124. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1988).
125. Henry exercised no supervisory authority over the plaintiff, but her duties required her to
work with him. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 615.
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ments at her.126 Henry "regularly spewed anti-female obscenity" and
"routinely referred to women as 'whores,' 'cunt,' 'pussy' and 'tits.' "127
He also remarked of the plaintiff, "All that bitch needs is a good lay" and
referred to her as "fat ass."1 28 The plaintiff further contended that she
was exposed to posters of nude women displayed by other male employ-
ees.129 The Sixth Circuit found that this conduct was not sufficiently
invasive of the plaintiff's working conditions to create an actionable hos-
tile work environment and affirmed the district court's entry of summary
judgment for the defendant. 130
a. Reliance on leading decisions on gender discrimination in the
work environment. In Rabidue, the Sixth Circuit compared the facts
alleged by the plaintiff to the facts alleged in Bundy, Henson, and Katz
and concluded that "[t]he precedential cases addressing a sexually hostile
and abusive environment ... have all developed more compelling cir-
cumstances than are presented herein."' 31 The court stated:
In the case at bar, the charges of sexually hostile and abusive environ-
ment were limited to pictorial calendar type office wall displays of
semi-nude and nude females and Henry's off-color language. Unlike
the facts of Bundy, Henson, and Katz, this case involved no sexual
propositions, offensive touchings, or sexual conduct of a similar nature
that was systematically directed to the plaintiff over a protracted pe-
riod of time.132
This mode of analysis is not unique to the Sixth Circuit 133 and may well
be repeated by other courts seeking to define the scope of the hostile
work environment.
In Rabidue, the Sixth Circuit relied not only on the facts of Henson,
but also on the test that the Eleventh Circuit set forth to evaluate the
126. Id.
127. Id. at 624 (Keith, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing district court's opin-
ion, Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., Inc., 584 F. Supp. 419, 423 (E.D. Mich. 1984)).
128. Id. Apparently, the company did not deny that Henry engaged in such conduct. The
majority referred to Henry as "an extremely vulgar and crude individual who customarily made
obscene comments about women generally, and, on occasion, directed such obscenities to the plain-
tiff." Id. at 615. The company had made unsuccessful efforts to curb Henry's conduct. Id.
129. Id. The dissent pointed out that one poster which was displayed for the entire seven years
the plaintiff worked at Osceola "showed a prone woman who had a golf ball on her breasts with a
man standing over her, golf club in hand, yelling 'Fore.' And one desk plaque declared 'Even male
chauvinist pigs need love.'" Id. at 624 (Keith, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
130. Id. at 622. See infra text accompanying notes 148-51.
131. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 622 n.7.
132. Id.
133. See Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210, 214 (7th Cir. 1986); Wimberley v.
Shoney's, Inc., 39 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 444, 453 (S.D. Ga. 1985).
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plaintiff's allegations of a hostile work environment. 134 The test consists
of five elements, one of which is proof of sexual harassment. The Elev-
enth Circuit stated in Henson that the plaintiff needed to prove the fol-
lowing elements to establish her claim: (1) The employee belongs to a
protected group; (2) The employee was subjected to unwelcome sexual
harassment; (3) The harassment complained of was based upon sex; (4)
The harassment complained of affected a "term, condition, or privilege"
of employment; and (5) [where harassment is by a co-worker or supervi-
sor] Respondeat superior.135
It is likely that courts faced with hostile work environment actions
based on claims of gender discrimination will rely on the fact pattern of
Meritor as well as the fact patterns of Bundy, Henson, and Katz. The
action in Meritor, like the actions in those cases, presented allegations of
egregious sexual harassment, including a claim of rape.136
All of these sources-the fact patterns of Bundy, Henson, Katz, and
Meritor, and the five-part test set out in Henson-create the impression
that evidence of sexual misconduct is a prerequisite for a hostile work
environment action.1 37 The holdings in these cases, however, derive
from the broad principle that all discrimination on the basis of an em-
ployee's gender that is sufficiently "severe or pervasive to alter the condi-
tions of employment" is actionable.1 38 Indeed, Meritor states the broad
proposition that "a plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by
proving that discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive
work environment." 139 To the extent that courts rely on the facts of
these cases rather than their rationales, they will tend to artificially re-
strict the hostile work environment action to claims of egregious sexual
harassment and to assign little weight to claims of gender-based
discrimination.
b. EEOC Guidelines. The Sixth Circuit in Rabidue also cited the
EEOC Guidelines as a "source of instruction to assist its efforts to probe
the parameters" of the hostile work environment action. 140 The Guide-
134. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 619-20; see also Downes v. FAA, 775 F.2d 288, 292-95 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (applying same test).
135. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903-05 (11th Cir. 1982).
136. See supra text accompanying note 11.
137. At least one commentator has noted the potential for confusion regarding the scope of the
hostile work environment action created by the fact pattern in Meritor. Hipp, Now You See It, Now
You Don't: The "Hostile Work Environment" After Meritor, 26 AM. Bus. L. J. 339, 340 (1988)
("[tihe factual context of Meritor does not seem to be representative of the typical claims based on
environmental factors").
138. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986).
139. Id. at 67.
140. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 619.
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lines, promulgated in 1980, have been extremely influential in the judicial
construction of the scope of the hostile work environment. 141 The
Guidelines provide:
Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of Sec. 703 [now section
2000e-2(a)(1)] of Title VII. Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for
sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature
constitute sexual harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is
made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individ-
ual's employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an
individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such
individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasona-
bly interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.' 42
In Rabidue, the Sixth Circuit interpreted the last sentence of the Guide-
lines as requiring the plaintiff to prove that "she had been subjected to
unwelcomed verbal conduct and poster displays of a sexual nature" in
order to prevail on her hostile work environment claim.143
The language of the EEOC Guidelines contributes to the impression
of many courts that egregious sexual harassment is the paradigm of a
Title VII hostile work environment violation. Although the Guidelines
begin with the broad proposition that ."harassment on the basis of sex"
violates Title VII, they offer only one example of such conduct-sexual
harassment. Section 1604.11(a) does not, of course, explicitly state that
"sexual harassment" is the only form of "harassment on the basis of
sex." The section, however, defines only "sexual harassment" and gives
no indication that it is merely one form of "harassment on the basis of
sex" or that other forms of "harassment on the basis of sex" may contrib-
ute to the creation of a hostile work environment. Thus, the Sixth Cir-
cuit's interpretation of the Guidelines in Rabidue was unfortunately
quite reasonable.
Courts may perceive "unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sex-
ual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature" re-
ferred to in the Guidelines as relatively identifiable and may thus accept
without challenge the notion that such conduct is a proper standard for
evaluating hostile work environment actions. However, "an EEOC regu-
lation that identifies certain activities as prohibited by Title VII [should
not] be taken to mean that any other activities are allowed."' 144 More-
over, the Supreme Court's language in Meritor provides a clear indica-
tion that the hostile work environment action applies to the entire
141. For example, Justice Rehnquist relied heavily on the Guidelines in Meritor. 477 U.S. at 65.
142. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1988).
143. 805 F.2d at 622 (emphasis added).
144. McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1139 n.20. (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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spectrum of gender discrimination in the workplace. 145  Courts should
not repeat the Sixth Circuit's mistake in Rabidue by limiting the remedy
to egregious sexual harassment.
3. Insufficient Effect on Working Conditions. Courts frequently
reject hostile work environment claims predicated on acts of gender-
based harassment on the basis that such conduct has not had a suffi-
ciently serious effect on a plaintiff's working conditions to be actiona-
ble.146 These decisions often find that an employer's conduct is not so
"severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions" of employment. 147
Although such decisions may in many cases be accounted for by failures
of proof, they also may be the products of courts' attitudes toward gen-
der-based harassment. These decisions often appear to reflect inadequate
consideration of the damage that gender-based harassment can cause to
an employee's psychological well-being. While courts unquestionably
view sexual harassment as capable of imposing a severe injury on em-
ployees, it is less clear that they appreciate the potential for adverse ef-
fects caused by gender-based harassment.
145. The Supreme Court noted in Meritor that while the Guidelines are helpful for construing
the scope of Title VII, they are "not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority." 477
U.S. at 65 (quoting General Elect. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1944)).
146. See Downum v. City of Wichita, 675 F. Supp. 1566, 1570 (10th Cir. 1986) (belittling and
offensive comments directed to female firefighter comprise "fairly insignificant part of the total job
environment"); Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., Inc., 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986) (discussed infra
text accompanying notes 148-51); Downes v. FAA, 775 F.2d 288 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (discussed infra
note 147); Hallquist v. Max Fish Plumbing & Heating Co., 46 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1855,
1860 (D. Mass. 1987) ("evidence [that plaintiff] was the subject of gender-related jokes and occa-
sional teasing... when offered alone to establish a claim under a hostile work environment theory is
insufficient"); Miller v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 679 F. Supp. 495, 502 (W.D. Pa. 1988) ("Snubs and
unjust criticisms of one's work are not poisonous enough to create an actionable hostile work
environment").
147. See Downes v. FAA, 775 F.2d 288 (Fed. Cir. 1985). In Downes, the Federal Aviation
Administration charged an aviation safety inspector with sexual harassment on the basis of the fol-
lowing conduct: (1) referring to a female employee as "the Dolly Parton of the office" in a conversa-
tion with a third person; (2) speculating in a telephone conversation with the employee on the
frequency of her sexual relationships after her divorce; (3) touching the employee's hair twice; (4)
asking the employee whether she ever considered trading sexual favors to get ahead in the agency
and stating, "Boy, if I had a body like yours, I'd really go places;" and (5) repeating in the office a
Bob Hope joke about women in tight shorts. The Federal Circuit reversed a decision of the Merit
Systems Protection Board which had sustained the charges against the inspector. The court found
that this conduct was not "sufficiently severe or persistent" to constitute a hostile work environment:
Even discounting the trivial nature of some incidents, these few instances, which we as-
sume to have occurred, do not establish a pattern of harassment directed to "female em-
ployees" or to a particular employee. They do not show that conduct has been repeated to
the point where it is "routine" or "of a generalized nature," i.e., has become a "condition"
of anyone's employment.
Id. at 294.
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Rabidue demonstrates an apparent lack of sensitivity to the capacity
of gender-based harassment to destroy an employee's psychological well-
being. The Sixth Circuit held that the obscenities and poster displays at
issue in Rabidue were not sufficiently serious to create a hostile work
environment. 148 The court found that:
Henry's obscenities, although annoying, were not so startling as to
have affected seriously the psyches of the plaintiff or other female em-
ployees. The evidence did not demonstrate that this single employee's
vulgarity substantially affected the totality of the workplace. The sexu-
ally oriented poster displays had a de minimis effect on the plaintiff's
work environment when considered in the context of a society that
condones and publicly features open displays of written and pictorial
erotica at the newsstands, on prime-time television, at the cinema, and
in other public places. t 49
Although the facts of Rabidue provide some justification for the view
that Henry's conduct did not affect "the totality of the workplace,"150
these facts do not appear to have been the basis of the Sixth Circuit's
opinion.
The Sixth Circuit, rather, appears to have denied the plaintiff's
claims on the basis of questionable assumptions about the effects of
Henry's obscenities and the poster displays. The court, as noted
above,151 described Henry's vulgarities as "off color language." This de-
scription is quite shocking given the nature of the terms he employed
when referring to women. The court additionally described Henry's ob-
scenities as "annoying," but not "startling." This claim is hardly com-
pelling. It is unlikely that employees who were subjected to Henry's
tirades-who were called "whores" by their supervisor-viewed these
obscenities as mild intrusions on the workplace. Finally, the Sixth Cir-
cuit appears to have assumed that because "pictorial erotica" is common-
place, it could not constitute part of a pattern of offensive working
conditions. However, as Judge Keith noted in dissent: "The presence of
pin-ups and misogynous language in the workplace can only evoke and
confirm the debilitating norms by which women are primarily and con-
temptuously valued as objects of male sexual fantasy."15 2
If Title VII is to provide an effective remedy for the entire spectrum
of gender discrimination in the workplace, courts must be sensitive to the
potential of all forms of gender discrimination to destroy an employee's
148. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 622.
149. Id.
150. For example, Henry was not the plaintiff's supervisor and she apparently did not have to
work with him on a daily basis. I at 615.
151. See supra text accompanying note 132.
152. Id. at 627 (Keith, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
1391Vol. 1990:1361]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
psychological well-being. To the extent that courts assign diminished
weight to allegations of gender-based harassment, they artificially restrict
the scope of the hostile work environment action.
B. Decisions Explicitly Recognizing Gender-Based Harassment as
Actionable
1. Mischaracterization of Claims as Actions for "Sexual Harass-
ment." A number of courts have explicitly recognized that gender dis-
crimination in the workplace is actionable without regard to the presence
of a sexual motive.15 3 Despite their unquestionable recognition of this
principle, these courts have articulated their conclusions in a manner
that potentially obscures the availability of Title VII as a remedy for
gender-based harassment. First, these courts continue to describe the
hostile work environment claim in the gender discrimination context as
an action for "sexual harassment."15 4 Second, despite the broad holdings
of these cases, most of these opinions deal with isolated acts of gender-
based harassment that occur within larger patterns of sexual
harassment. 155
In Hall v. Gus Construction Co., 156 the Eighth Circuit recognized
that gender discrimination in the work environment is actionable regard-
less of whether it is sexually motivated. Hall involved a claim by three
female employees of a construction company that their supervisors and
co-workers subjected them to persistent discriminatory treatment. The
pattern of abuse alleged by these employees included certain acts of gen-
der-based harassment: references to one plaintiff as "Herpes" because of
a skin condition; male crew members urinating in the gas tank of another
plaintiff's car (characterized as a practical joke); and the company's fail-
ure to fix certain equipment while female employees were operating it.
The plaintiffs also alleged acts of sexual harassment, contending that
male construction workers repeatedly requested sexual favors, exposed
themselves to the women, engaged in offensive physical touchings, and
inflicted "verbal sexual abuse" on the plaintiffs.15 7
153. See Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010 (8th Cir. 1988); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833
F.2d 1406 (10th Cir. 1987); McKinney v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Bell v. Crackin
Good Bakers, 777 F.2d 1497 (11th Cir. 1985).
154. See Hall, 842 F.2d at 1013; Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1408; McKinney, 765 F.2d at 1131 (describ-
ing action as one for "sex discrimination/sexual harassment").
155. See Hall, 842 F.2d at 1012 (discussed infra text accompanying notes 156-61); Hcks, 833
F.2d at 1409-10 (allegation of gender-based intimidation along with allegation of offensive physical
touchings); McKinney, 765 F.2d at 1131 (allegation of use of force against female employee in con-
text of allegations of "sexual advances and other sexual importunings" by male supervisors).
156. 842 F.2d 1010 (8th Cir. 1988).
157. Id. at 1012.
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The employer argued that only "conduct of a sexual nature" was
relevant to a hostile work environment action and complained that the
district court had improperly considered evidence of non-sexual incidents
in assessing the plaintiffs' claim. 158 The Eighth Circuit held that the dis-
trict court's consideration of these incidents was proper.159 The court of
appeals reasoned that "[i]ntimidation and hostility toward women be-
cause they are women can obviously result from conduct other than ex-
plicit sexual advances." 160 Judge Wollman articulated the somewhat
paradoxical conclusion that "the predicate acts underlying a sexual har-
assment claim need not be clearly sexual in nature."' 61 Thus, although
the Eighth Circuit clearly recognized that gender discrimination in the
work environment is actionable even in the absence of a sexual motive, it
defined the plaintiff's action as a "sexual harassment claim."
The Eighth Circuit's characterization of the claim in Hall as one for
"sexual harassment" presents a semantic problem. The plaintiff's claim
was not in fact limited to allegations of sexual harassment. More impor-
tantly, however, this characterization creates confusion as to the true
scope of employees' rights under Title VII. To the extent that the plain-
tiffs did present allegations of sexually motivated behavior, the court had
an independent basis upon which to conclude that all of the defendants'
conduct, even that which was not sexual in nature, was motivated by
gender.162 Potential litigants thus could reasonably believe that a "sexual
harassment claim" requires them to allege at least some instance of sexu-
ally motivated behavior. Such a perception would deter employees from
bringing hostile work environment actions founded solely on acts of gen-
der-based harassment and would effectively render employers who create
offensive working conditions on the basis of gender-but who do not sex-
ually harass their workers-immune from liability under Title VII.
2. Gender-Based Harassment as the Sole Basis for a Hostile Work
Environment Action. There is at least one decision, Bell v. Crackin
Good Bakers, Inc., 6 3 that appears to recognize that a pattern of gender-
based harassment can by itself serve as the predicate for a hostile work
158. Id. at 1013.
159. Id. at 1014.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.; see also Hicks 833 F.2d at 1409-10 (allegation of gender-based intimidation along with
allegation of offensive physical touchings); McKinney, 765 F.2d at 1131 (allegation of use of force
against female employee in context of allegations of "sexual advances and other sexual importun-
ings" by male supervisors).
163. 777 F.2d 1497 (1Ith Cir. 1985).
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environment action.' 64 ' Although the crucial passage in Bell contains
some confusing language, the Eleventh Circuit's opinion indicates that
such a claim is cognizable under Title VII.
Bell involved a female employee's allegations that her immediate su-
pervisor (a male) undertook a deliberate scheme to force her to resign.
The plaintiff, Delores Bell, contended that her supervisor directed her to
perform certain tasks and then criticized her for acting without authority
to do so, yelled at her, assigned her numerous tasks at once, and treated
her "like [she] was about two years old and two inches high."' 165 For
purposes of considering the defendant's summary judgment motion, both
the district court and the Eleventh Circuit accepted the plaintiff's allega-
tions as true. 166 The district court granted summary judgment for the
defendant on these facts, finding no evidence that the supervisor "wanted
her to resign because she was female." 167 The district court treated the
action as one for "sexual harassment."'1 68
On appeal, however, the Eleventh Circuit considered additional evi-
dence that it believed was capable of demonstrating that the supervisor's
harassment was indeed motivated by gender. 169 This evidence included
testimony that the supervisor had stated that men were more effective
workers than women, that he constantly belittled the plaintiff, and that
he treated men who occupied the same position in a different manner
than he treated Bell. 170
The Eleventh Circuit found that the district court's treatment of the
plaintiff's action as one for "sexual harassment" was erroneous.' 7 1 The
district court's characterization of the action was flawed because "[t]he
plaintiff offered no proof of actions by [her immediate supervisor] or by
any other supervisory employee that would fall within the context of this
164. See also Bennett v. Corroon & Black Corp., 845 F.2d 104, 106 (5th Cir. 1988) (noting that
depiction of female employee in obscene cartoons in men's bathroom constitutes the "perfect matrix
to grow the hostile work environment subjecting a woman to discriminatory intimidation, ridicule,
and insult which Title VII protects against," but holding this act insufficiently "severe or pervasive"
to violate the statute), cert denied, 489 U.S. 1020 (1989).
165. Bell, 777 F.2d at 1499.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1502.
169. Id. at 1501 ("It is evident that inferences could well be drawn from the totality of the
evidence given on behalf of the petitioner that would support her contention that the employer was
guilty of discriminating against her with respect to the conditions of her employment on the grounds
of her sex.")
170. Id. at 1500.
171. Id. at 1503 ("It is clear that the [district] court viewed the evidence offered by the plaintiff
under the wrong standard.")
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Court's definition of 'sexual harassment.' "172 The Eleventh Circuit fol-
lowed the definition of sexual harassment set forth in the EEOC Guide-
lines, which encompasses only "conduct of a sexual nature."
173
The court of appeals indicated that the plaintiff's claim was one for
"sexual/gender discrimination." 174 It identified the McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green 175 framework as the appropriate method to determine
whether the plaintiff had been subjected to unequal treatment because of
her sex and squarely held that Bell was "under no obligation to adduce
proof of 'sexual advances, requests for sexual favors [or] other verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature.' "176 The plaintiff thus could estab-
lish the existence of discrimination "because of sex" simply on the basis
of her supervisor's apparent chauvinism and general hostility toward
women.
The Eleventh Circuit appears to have recognized that the predicate
acts for a hostile work environment action need not be sexual in nature.
After discussing the hostile work environment claim at length and quot-
ing from Rogers v. EEOC, 177 the court stated: "Such harassment can be
of at least two kinds: (1) a threatening, bellicose, demeaning, hostile or
offensive conduct by a supervisor in the workplace because of the sex of
the victim of such conduct; or (2) 'unwelcome sexual advances' generally
known as a 'quid pro quo' ground." 178 Bell's case clearly fits only the
first category. To the extent that the Eleventh Circuit reversed the dis-
trict court's grant of summary judgment and allowed Bell to proceed
with her claim, it recognized that "threatening, bellicose, demeaning,
hostile or offensive conduct by a supervisor in the workplace because of
the sex of the victim of such conduct" encompasses harassment that is
entirely free of sexual content. The net effect of Bell was to allow a plain-
tiff who brought a hostile work environment action founded solely on
gender-based harassment the opportunity to prove her case.
172. Id. at 1502. The court also stated that "[t]he complaint made no contention of 'sexual
harassment' in the context of the Henson case". Id
173. See supra text accompanying note 142.
174. Id. at 1502.
175. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See supra text accompanying note 89.
176. Bell, 777 F.2d at 1503.
177. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971).
178. Bell, 777 F.2d at 1503. The ambiguity in Bell arises because it is unclear precisely to what
the phrase "[s]uch harassment" refers. It appears to refer to "[s]exual harassment which creates a
hostile or offensive environment," a phrase used in the immediately preceding paragraph. However,
the court probably used the phrase "[s]uch harassment," more broadly to refer to harassment suffi-
cient to constitute a hostile work environment. This interpretation is certainly plausible given that
the first category delineated by the court clearly contains no requirement of conduct of a sexual
nature.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Title VII is aimed at eliminating gender discrimination that affects
the "terms, conditions, and privileges" of employment. If courts are
willing to characterize an employee's psychological well-being as a pro-
tected condition of employment, then they should not place arbitrary re-
strictions on the protection of that condition. Title VII proscribes all
gender discrimination that is sufficiently intrusive on an employee's
psyche. There is no rationale for restricting the statute's application to
only sexually motivated discrimination that poisons the work environ-
ment. Unequivocal recognition of gender-based harassment as a viable
predicate for a hostile work environment action is necessary to give em-
ployees a remedy for the entire spectrum of gender discrimination in the
workplace.
Recognition that gender discrimination in the workplace is actiona-
ble without regard to the presence of sexual motives has potentially far-
reaching implications. The hostile work environment claim makes ac-
tionable an extremely broad and ill-defined range of conduct. It will be
difficult for employers to predict what types of conduct constitute "in-
timidation" or "humiliation" forbidden by Title VII. In order to avoid
violating the statute, employers may be forced to restructure the way
they think about female employees by carefully considering the motives
behind their treatment of women.
The seemingly broad implications of this Note merely highlight the
extent to which gender discrimination is ingrained in the workplace. If
gender-based harassment is recognized as actionable, employers may
wonder whether-calling a female employee, "Honey," or making sexist
jokes will lead to liability under Title VII. It is doubtful, however,
whether employers have much question about whether calling black em-
ployees, "Boy," or making racist jokes, if sufficiently patterned, will lead
to such liability. Arguably, the difference is that sexist behavior is per-
ceived as relatively more acceptable, or as relatively less offensive, than
racist behavior in the workplaces of America. Title VII should not coun-
tenance this perception.
Although the implications of recognizing gender-based harassment
as actionable are clearly very broad, limiting principles exist within cur-
rent hostile work environment jurisprudence. Gender-based harassment
must be "severe or pervasive" in order to be actionable. This test, if
properly applied, ensures that not every utterance of the term "Honey"
and not every sexist joke is actionable. The problem with the current
judicial application of the "severe or pervasive" test is one of inadequate
appreciation of the harm that gender-based harassment can cause. If rec-
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ognition of gender-based harassment as actionable is to have any real
effect in the workplace, courts must apply this standard in a non-sexist
fashion.
Finally, the current judicial focus on sexual harassment is obviously
commendable because it redresses very serious injuries. This focus, how-
ever, also has the negative effect of restricting the types of gender dis-
crimination for which female employees have a remedy. The ability of
women to remedy all forms of gender discrimination that affect their
working conditions will be of increasing concern as women continue to
enter the work force in larger numbers. The hostile work environment
action can be an important tool in the effort to eradicate barriers to equal
opportunity in the workplace.
Joshua F. Thorpe
